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TRADING WATER: USING TRADABLE PERMITS TO 
PROMOTE CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION 
OF AN INCREASINGLY SCARCE RESOURCE 
ABSTRACT 
Growing populations and changing climate patterns are causing water 
shortages in areas that have not previously experienced such water scarcity.  
Governments are forced to implement short-term ad hoc measures to address 
shortages because they have not implemented long-term conservation and 
efficient-use policies.  Permanent policies that conserve and more efficiently 
allocate water resources should be implemented to prevent, or more effectively 
manage, water shortages. 
This Comment argues that a free-market system for water-use rights should 
be implemented to address and prevent water shortages.  A water market 
system would require that secure property rights be attached to water use and 
that those rights be freely tradable.  Current water-rights regimes  used in the 
United States are not sufficient to support such a market system because 
current regimes do not grant secure property rights in water use, and it is 
unclear to what extent water-use rights can be transferred.  Therefore, a 
market system under the current water-rights regimes  would not be able to 
maximize its potential to promote efficient allocation of water resources. 
This Comment argues that tradable permits for water use should be used as 
the currency of a water market system.  A water use permit would secure for its 
holder a right to a certain level of water use and would be freely tradable.  The 
aggregate level of sustainable water withdrawal and consumption would be 
determined by the state, and the water-use permits  would be distributed to 
current users at no cost.  The amount of use allowed by the permit would be 
based on each user’s current and historical water use.  The permits could then 
be traded in a market, encouraging efficient use, conservation, and the highest 
economic allocation of water resources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Due to growing demand from expanding populations and industry and an 
increasing frequency of drought conditions, water shortages in the United 
States have been increasing.1  Some commentators believe that global warming 
has contributed to more frequent drought conditions, a trend they believe will 
continue to worsen.2  To ensure water is available for basic needs, policy 
makers have implemented temporary conservation measures such as water 
rationing,3 and restrictions on watering lawns, filling swimming pools, and 
washing cars.4 
In 2009 as California appeared to be facing its third drought year in a row, 
the state considered managing the shortage by implementing rationing policies 
that would reduce users’ water access by up to twenty percent.5  The U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, a water provider in California,6 planned to cut off 
water for agricultural use in the Central Valley region of the state and cut the 
water allotment for municipalities and industrial users in half.7  One irrigation 
specialist at a commercial farm that also used its own wells and pipelines said 
 
 1 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle 
over the ‘Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 828 (2005) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles] (noting 
that the southeastern U.S. region experienced the worst drought in its recorded history in the 1980s and still 
worse drought conditions at the beginning of the 21st century); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water 
Allocation in the Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 9, 10 (2002) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Water Allocation] (stating that in the eastern half of the United 
States, growing demand and erratic climate patterns have caused more frequent shortages); Felicity Barringer, 
Signs of Another California Drought Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at A15 (“California, just finished with its 
second consecutive year of drought, might well be facing a third.”); see also Janet C. Neuman, Federal Water 
Policy: An Idea Whose Time Will (Finally) Come, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 110–11 (2001) (noting that the 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that population is growing fastest in areas with less water). 
 2 E.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.01, at 9-10, 
9-11 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelly eds.,  repl. vol. ed. 2007) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Regulated 
Riparianism] (noting that climate change is predicted to cause increasing frequency of both droughts and 
floods); Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stuntz & Robert H. Abrams, Climate Change and Freshwater Resources, 22  
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 30 (2008) (noting that scientists predict climate change will have an adverse impact 
on water resources). 
 3 See, e.g., Barringer, supra note 1 (reporting that California may impose water rationing). 
 4 See, e.g., Stacy Shelton & John C. Perry, Only Toughest Ban Reduced Water Use, ATLANTA J.- 
CONST., Feb. 24, 2008, at D1 (reporting on water conservation measures implemented in Georgia during 
drought conditions). 
 5 Ari B. Bloomekatz, U.S. Plans to Tighten Tap for Farmers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at B3. 
 6 The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation operates dams and reservoirs in the western United States and sells 
water in the wholesale market and to agricultural users.  U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: About Us, 
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2010). 
 7 Bloomekatz, supra note 5. 
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that, under the drought conditions, he would be happy if the farm received one-
sixth of the agricultural water it received under normal conditions.8 
It is apparent that in future times of drought and water shortage, temporary 
conservation measures will not be sufficient to preserve adequate water 
resources, particularly in areas of continuing population growth.9  
Compounding the problem, population growth often takes place in areas that 
do not have adequate water resources to begin with.10  Thus, more permanent 
measures will be required to solve the water shortage problem.11  This 
Comment argues that a more effective and permanent water conservation 
strategy for state governments would be (1) to cap or limit water use at a 
predetermined sustainable level; (2) to allocate among existing users tradable 
or transferable withdrawal permits that grant property rights in water use and 
that collectively permit aggregate water use no greater than the predetermined 
cap; and (3) to facilitate a free market for the trading of such water-use 
permits.  These permits would give their holders the right to use a certain 
amount of water by withdrawing it from a water source.12 
A cap on the total level of water use would enable policy makers to ensure 
that water resources are maintained at a sustainable level.13  The initial 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 34 (“[W]e must reform water law and policy to emphasize 
conservation and efficient, environmentally sound allocation.”); Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The 
Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 601, 603 (2006) (arguing that conservation and more efficient allocation are the solutions to inadequate water 
supply); see also Stacy Shelton, Atlanta Water Supply Precarious; Without Conservation, Future Looks Glum, 
ATLANTA J.- CONST., June 27, 2005, at E1 (citing district water plans, reporting that water shortages are 
projected in north Georgia, which includes Atlanta, unless there are “aggressive conservation measures and 
new lakes to store water”). 
 10 See Stephen E. Draper, The Unintended Consequences of Tradable Property Rights to Water, 20 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 49 (2005) (“Increasingly in the United States, commercial activities and growing 
population centers have developed in areas with scarce water resources.”); Neuman, supra note 1, at 110–11. 
 11 Supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 12 The distinction should be made between the right to withdraw water, which would be attached to the 
permits this Comment proposes, and the possession or ownership rights of particular water from a particular 
source.  This distinction is important because a withdrawal right can be transferred to a different location that 
has a different water source.  See Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, 14 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 266 (2006) (a tradable permit system does not “privatiz[e] the resource;” it “privatizes the 
right to access the resource”); see also James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation 
States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 439 (2004) (explaining that water’s physical 
properties makes “it impossible, with some exceptions, to actually possess the same water for an extended 
period,” but that this “is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle to water marketing”).  For a further 
discussion of transferring a tradable permit for water use to a location other than where the permit was initially 
allocated, see infra Part II.A.2. 
 13 See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 265 (describing the basic attributes of a cap-and-trade system). 
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allocation of water-use rights would be based on existing levels of actual use, 
not the level of use that would attach through current water-rights laws.14  By 
then allowing water-use permits to be bought and sold in a market 
environment, water could be allocated more efficiently because the holder of a 
permit would have an incentive to sell it in the market to a user who values it 
more highly.15 
Although there are economic benefits to a market system, there are also 
problems that may arise in such a system, particularly when applied to a 
precious resource such as water.  Criticisms of water markets include concerns 
that states may be unable to prevent water from being transferred and used out-
of-state,16 that smaller agricultural users and consumers may not be able to 
afford to participate in the market,17 and that transaction costs associated with 
implementing and facilitating the system will erode any gains that might have 
been attainable.18 
Any change in water rights law would need to be implemented by the 
states.19  The federal government has implemented legislation addressing 
specific issues related to water resources;20 however, state law governs water 
 
 14 See infra Part I for a discussion of current water-rights regimes.  For a discussion of the system 
proposed by this Comment, see infra Part III. 
 15 See generally Huffman, supra note 12, at 432 (“[A] well functioning market is the most effective and 
efficient institution to allocate scarce resources.”); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and 
Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 569, 572 (2001) (describing emission permit trading systems as reducing “aggregate emissions to the 
chosen aggregate level for the least cost” when there is an active market); Janet C. Neuman, Have We Got a 
Deal for You: Can the East Borrow from the Western Water Marketing Experience?, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
449, 497 (2004) (“Subjecting water to market forces such as price signals can promote more efficient water  
use . . . .”); Richard B. Stewart, Panel I: Liberty, Property, and Environmental Ethics, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411, 
414 (1994) (“The advantages of . . . tradable permits are quite clear in economic terms.”); Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 175, 176–77 (2003) (arguing 
for and describing benefits of applying economic theory to environmental regulation).  But see Draper, supra 
note 10, at 49 (noting that imposing economics on water allocation may have “unintended consequences that 
outweigh its benefits”). 
 16 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 53. 
 17 See, e.g., Wilson Barmeyer, Note, The Problem of Reallocation in a Regulated Riparian System: 
Examining the Law in Georgia, 40 GA. L. REV. 207, 237–38 (2005) (noting the possibility of “inequitable 
allocation of water dependant on economic wealth”). 
 18 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 51–52 (discussing transaction costs and externalities).  For a 
discussion of the criticisms of a market for water, see infra Part II.B. 
 19 See Huffman, supra note 12, at 442 (noting the possibility of a federal water rights law, but that “it 
would be very disruptive to shift from the well-established state water rights regimes”). 
 20 See Neuman, supra note 1, at 107–08, 113 (noting that federal legislation has addressed “water supply, 
pollution, dams, hydropower development, navigation, flood control, fisheries, and research” and that the 
federal government spends more than ten billion dollars annually on water programs). 
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rights.21  Although implementation of a tradable permit market for water at the 
federal level could impose a uniform system across all the states, such a  
change in the existing law would introduce issues of federalism that are 
beyond the scope of this Comment.22  Instead, this Comment focuses on a 
structure of a market for tradable permits that could be implemented and 
tailored as needed by each state to conserve and efficiently allocate its water 
resources. 
In addition to arguing that a cap-and-trade system for allocating water use 
should be implemented to address water shortages, this Comment demonstrates 
why the two current water-rights systems—riparian rights in the East and prior 
appropriation in the West—and their regulated variations cannot support such 
a system.23  Property rights in water use and the extent to which water-use 
rights can be transferred—characteristics that are essential for a robust and 
efficient permit trading market—are uncertain in both riparian rights and prior 
appropriation systems.24  Therefore, this Comment argues that a new water-
rights system that provides for water-use permits that have vested property 
rights and that are freely tradable is necessary for a market system that 
maximizes its potential to conserve and efficiently allocate water resources. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the water-rights regimes currently used in 
the United States.  Part II discusses the various design considerations and 
structures of tradable permit systems, how tradable permit systems have been 
used in other contexts,25 and how they might be used in a water-market system.  
Part III proposes and describes a market system that uses as its currency 
tradable permits for water withdrawal and that attempts to minimize the risks 
associated with water markets, while maintaining the gains in conservation and 
economic efficiency promoted by such a system. 
 
 21 See Zach Willey & Tom Graff, Federal Water Policy in the United States—An Agenda for Economic 
and Environmental Reform, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 325, 347 (1988) (“State water laws have established 
rights to use water under appropriative, riparian, correlative, and other conditions.”). 
 22 See Neuman, supra note 1, at 114–16 (arguing for a federal water-use policy but stating that “a major 
political barrier preventing the development of a rational, federal water policy is the tension of federalism 
itself”).  For a discussion of why a federal water use policy is a good idea, see Neuman, supra note 1. 
 23 See infra Parts I.A.3 & I.B.2. 
 24 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 12, at 443 (“One cannot overemphasize the importance of secure, well-
defined, and enforceable property rights.  The rights must be exclusive, universal, and transferable.”).  For a 
discussion of the why both systems are inadequate for a water-market system, see infra Parts I.A.3 and I.B.2. 
 25 Tradable permits have been used to limit pollution and regulate use of common resources such as 
habitats and fisheries.  James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental 
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 616 (2000). 
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I. CURRENT WATER-LAW REGIMES AND WHY THEY WOULD NOT SUPPORT A 
WATER-MARKET SYSTEM 
This Part explores current water-law regimes used in the United States and 
explains why they would not adequately support a tradable permit water-
market system.  Section A discusses the historical common law riparian rights 
system generally used in the eastern states and explains how that system has 
been modified by state legislatures into its current form.  Section B discusses 
the prior appropriation system generally used in the western states. 
A. Riparian Systems and Their Regulated Progeny 
This section discusses common law riparian rights and how those common 
law rights systems have been modified by state legislatures.  It also discusses 
why neither common law riparian rights nor their legislatively-modified 
variations would adequately support a market for tradable water-use permits. 
1. Common Law Riparian Rights 
Common law riparian rights establish and govern the rights of water users 
to access and consume water resources.26  The riparian rights doctrine 
developed in the eastern part of the United States, and its application has 
generally been limited to that area.27  Riparian rights are a common property 
system, which means that for the most part users are given discretion to decide 
how they use the resource.28  The doctrine is based on the theory that land 
appurtenant to a body of water has a “bundle of rights” associated with that 
physical proximity.29  For purposes of this Comment, the most important of 
these is the right to use and consume water because it results in depletion of the 
resource.30  Common consumptive uses include irrigation, household 
distribution through public utilities, and industrial processing.31 
 
 26 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 11. 
 27 See id. at 9 (noting that riparian rights developed east of Kansas City, where water was abundant, and 
appropriative rights were used west of Kansas City, where water was more scarce). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 
2, § 6.01(a), at 6-7 [hereinafter Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights]; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 843 (1979) (“The term ‘riparian land’ . . . means a tract of land that borders on a 
watercourse or lake, whether or not it includes a part of the bed of the watercourse or lake.”). 
 30 See Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, supra note 29, § 6.01(a)(4), at 6-70 (“Consumptive 
uses create interferences with competing uses that are permanent.”).  The bundle of rights also includes, but is 
not necessarily limited to, the right to access the water, the right to build a pier, the right to accretions 
(sedimentary deposits), and the right to “own the subsoil of nonnavigable streams and other ‘private’ waters.”  
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When common law riparian rights developed in the early nineteenth 
century,32 there was no apparent shortage of water in eastern states, and 
therefore no apparent need to restrict water use.33  Thus, under what is 
generally known as the reasonable use standard, a riparian land owner has the 
right to unlimited reasonable use of a water source, subject only to the 
reasonable use rights that other riparian users have to the same body of water.34  
Under this rule, the only consideration is whether a use interferes with another 
riparian’s35 right to reasonable use of the source; the effect that a use has on the 
body of water itself is not relevant.36  Under the rule adopted by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the reasonableness of the use is determined by 
consideration of a number of factors including the purpose, social value, and 
economic value of the use.37  Traditional reasonable-use common law holds 
that a non riparian use38 of a water source that affects a riparian use in any way 
is per se unreasonable.39  Courts in most riparian states still apply this strict 
common law rule to nonriparian use.40 
 
Id. § 6.01(a), at 6-8.  Courts make a distinction between uses which are consumptive and those that are not 
consumptive.  As Dellapenna notes that “[a]mong the most common non-consumptive uses recognized by the 
law have been navigation, fishing, hunting, and swimming.”  Id. § 6.01(a)(3), at 6-60, 6-61. 
 31 See id. § 6.01(a)(4), at 6-69, 6-70.  Other consumptive uses include animal husbandry, mineral mining, 
and steam-generated power.  Id. 
 32 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 11 n.12 (noting that Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 
472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312), is “often cited as the first true riparian rights case”). 
 33 See id. at 9. 
 34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979) (“A riparian proprietor is subject to liability for 
making an unreasonable use of the water of a watercourse or lake that causes harm to another riparian 
proprietor’s reasonable use of water or his land.”); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under 
“Pure” Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(d), at 7-48 [hereinafter 
Dellapenna, Right to Consume] (describing the reasonable-use theory of riparian rights). 
 35 Riparian refers to an owner of riparian land.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (8th ed. 2004). 
 36 See Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.02(d), at 7-49 (noting that courts will find 
liability where another riparian suffers “unreasonable injury”). 
 37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).  In addition, the Restatement lists the following 
factors: level of harm caused by the use, the ability of one of the users to avoid the harm, the ability of each 
user to meet their needs using less water, the protection of existing economic value in the use, and the fairness 
of causing the harmful user to bear the loss from fewer use rights.  Id.; cf. Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra 
note 1, at 15 n.36 (explaining that many cases only consider economic factors: “These [non-economic] 
principles figure prominently in the Restatement (Second) even if they do not figure prominently in the 
cases.”). 
 38 According the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[n]onriparian uses are those made neither on nor in 
connection with the use of riparian land, and include irrigation of nonriparian land and use in manufacturing 
on nonriparian land, even though the land belongs to the owner of riparian land. They also include the 
diversion and sale of water for consumption by nonriparian customers of water companies and inhabitants of 
cities.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 cmt. a (1979). 
 39 Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.02(d)(1), at 7-54.  As will be discussed in Parts II 
and III of this Comment, a tradable permit water-market system is not viable unless nonriparian use is allowed 
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Since common law riparian rights accrue to the rights-holder through 
ownership of land that is appurtenant to the water source,41 in the early 
development of common law riparian rights, the rights were often transferable 
only as an attachment to the appurtenant land.42  Over time, however, 
exceptions to that common law rule developed.43  Some courts have allowed 
transfer of riparian rights to a nonriparian user apart from the appurtenant land, 
but the alienability of the rights often depends upon whether the contemplated 
use is consumptive or non-consumptive.44  As Professor Dellapenna notes, 
grants by riparians allowed by a state would bind the grantor, but “the extent to 
which the grant conveys rights [to the grantee] against any riparians other than 
the grantor is far from clear.”45  This uncertainty demonstrates the difficulty in 
determining what standard of “reasonable use” should attach to a transfer of 
rights from a riparian user on appurtenant land to a nonriparian user.46 
2. Regulated Riparianism 
Legislative modifications of riparian rights are commonly referred to as 
regulated riparianism,47 and they are generally intended to address water 
supply shortages.48  Commentators have concluded that common law riparian 
rights without any legislative modification are not well suited to allocate water 
during water shortages because the system is limited in its ability to restrict 
use, and disputes among users require the expense, time, and uncertainty of 
 
to occur.  See id. § 7.04, at 7-108 (“There is . . . no reason to believe that the economically most productive use 
of water from a particular waterbody will always lie on contiguous land.”). 
 40 Id. § 7.02(d)(1), at 7-54, 7-55.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts and courts in New Hampshire, 
Vermont, and Georgia have rejected the common law rule that nonriparian use is per se unreasonable.  Id.  
Some states have passed legislation that may be interpreted to overrule the common law rule, but, as Professor 
Dellapenna concludes, the question is often not directly addressed and, therefore, the status of the common law 
rule is uncertain in many states.  Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(2), at 9-70 
(discussing these legislative modifications in various states). 
 41 See Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.01, at 7-2 (noting that the “basic concept of 
riparian rights” is that each land owner next to the water has equal rights to the other appurtenant land owners). 
 42 Id. § 7.04, at 7-107. 
 43 See generally id. at 7-108 (explaining that every state has, to varying degrees, loosened the restriction 
on alienability of riparian rights). 
 44 Id. § 7.04(a)(3), at 7-117. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 17–18 (noting the uncertainty as to whose level of 
“reasonable use” is acquired by a non-riparian user). 
 47 E.g., Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.01, at 9-17 & n.51. 
 48 See generally id. at 9-15 (discussing the conditions that led to development of regulated riparianism). 
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litigation to resolve.49  Dellapenna has concluded that nineteen of thirty-one 
eastern states have implemented “comprehensive regulated riparian[ism].”50 
The most common feature of regulated riparianism is a permit requirement 
for certain types and manners of use.51  Common uses that trigger permit 
requirements are (1) withdrawals over a certain amount,52 (2) withdrawals 
from certain sources,53 and (3) inter-basin transfers of water.54  It is not entirely 
clear whether regulated riparianism relaxes restrictions on water rights 
transfers to nonriparians because the statutes often do not directly address the 
issue.55  Dellapenna has suggested that the best interpretation in such cases 
may be that the legislatures implicitly intended to leave the common law rule 
in place.56 
Regulated riparian statues also tend to exempt certain water users, often 
weakening the statute’s intended effect.57  Common explicit permit exemptions 
in regulated riparian statutes include agricultural use,58 domestic use,59 and 
uses that were already established when the permit system was implemented.60  
Groundwater is often regulated within the same system as surface water, 
extending the reach of the regulations to more consumptive uses.61  Most 
 
 49 See id. § 9.01, at 9-12, 9-13, § 9.03, at 9-52 (summarizing criticisms of common law riparian rights as 
an allocation system during water shortages). 
 50 Id. § 9.03, at 9-54 (citing statutes in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 51 See id. § 9.03(a), at 9-62 (“Easily the most significant innovation under regulated riparianism, the 
feature that most sharply sets it apart from traditional riparian rights, is that direct users of water must have a 
permit from a state administrative agency in order to be entitled to use water.”). 
 52 See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 12-5-96 (2009) (requiring permit for groundwater withdrawals greater 
than 100,000 gallons per day). 
 53 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.03, at 9-53 (citing 615 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
50/1–50/14 (2009) (requiring permits for withdrawals from Lake Michigan)). 
 54 See id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. 49-21-10 to -80 (2009)). 
 55 Id. § 9.03(a)(2), at 9-70. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. § 9.03(a)(3) (discussing exemptions from permit requirement in regulated riparian systems). 
 58 See id., at 9-76, 9-77 (citing statues exempting agricultural use to varying extents in Kentucky, 
Maryland, Georgia, Michigan, Iowa, Maryland, and Minnesota). 
 59 See id., at 9-75 (citing statutes explicitly exempting domestic use in Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Minnesota, and Mississippi, and statutes that permit withdrawal amounts so large as to effectively 
exempt domestic use in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin). 
 60 See id., at 9-77 (“Most of the statutes either exempt at least some uses established on the effective date 
of the statute from the permit requirement or guarantees an initial permit to established uses.”). 
 61 Id. § 9.03(a)(1), at 9-66 (noting that “fourteen of the nineteen regulated riparian states” have included 
ground water in their regulated riparianism laws). 
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states, however, exclude from the permitting system “diffuse”62 water bodies 
by (1) expressly excluding them, (2) expressly applying the scheme to only 
certain water bodies, (3) exempting lakes and ponds, (4) exempting water 
bodies contained on the property of a single owner, or (5) exempting regulation 
of diffuse water bodies except in times of shortage.63  Dellapenna notes that 
these exemptions largely benefit agricultural uses and that “they obviously 
impair the administering agency’s ability to undertake effective management in 
the face of system-wide shortages.”64  Government subsidies, which can 
increase agricultural water use, exacerbate the problem.65  The permit 
exemptions mentioned above are often based more on political preferences 
than any societal benefits rationale, so they “undermine the entire scheme of 
regulating uses in the public interest.”66 
Regulated riparian systems that exempt agricultural users adversely affect 
policy makers’ ability to effectively regulate water use in the aggregate 
because agricultural use comprises such a large portion of consumptive uses.67  
One of the best examples of this problem is the set of exemptions for 
agricultural use in Georgia’s regulation system.68  The Ground-water Use Act 
of 197269 and the Georgia Water Quality Control Act,70 which was first passed 
in 1964, both require certain water users to obtain permits from the state before 
using water resources.  The basic requirement of the two laws is that any user 
withdrawing more than 100,000 gallons per day of water from a ground or 
surface source must first obtain a permit.71  Agricultural users face less 
 
 62 Diffuse water can generally be described as surface water that is not part of a defined water body.  See, 
e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (2009) (describing diffused surface water as “water occurring upon the 
surface of the ground other than in contained water bodies”); Court Reports, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 445, 
466 (2008) (describing diffuse surface waters as “waters from rain or melting snows flowing over land and not 
part of a defined watercourse”). 
 63 See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(1), at 9-67 (describing various state 
laws with respect to diffuse surface waters). 
 64 Id. at 9-69. 
 65 Willey & Graff, supra note 21, at 326. 
 66 Dellapenna, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(3), at 9-80 (“To exempt such activities . . . serves little purpose 
other than capitulation to the political strength of the groups exempted.”). 
 67 See Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838 (labeling irrigation as “generally the most 
heavily consumptive use of water”). 
 68 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that agricultural exemptions in Georgia 
“go far beyond the exclusions of certain uses in other regulated riparian states”). 
 69 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-90 to -107 (2009).  As the name suggests, this law applies to use of ground 
water. 
 70 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-20 to -53 (2009).  This law applies to use of surface water. 
 71 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(1)(A), 12-5-96(a)(1) (2009).  See also Dellapenna, Water Allocation, 
supra note 1, at 68–70 (describing the provisions of each statute). 
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stringent requirements under the statutes.72  Both laws provide that a 
withdrawal permit up to the operating capacity of a farm shall be issued for 
any farm that used the water source prior to July 1, 1988, and applied for the 
permit prior to July 1, 1991.73  Under both statutes, farm-use permits applied 
for before April 20, 2006, or which are not within the Flint River basin,74 have 
no expiration; permits applied for on or after April 20, 2006, for a farm within 
the Flint River basin have a twenty-five-year term, but they are renewable at 
the original withdrawal capacity unless the “original capacity would have 
unreasonable adverse effects upon other water uses.”75  Under this regulation 
scheme, policy makers in Georgia are limited in their ability to implement 
conservation measures targeted at agricultural use.76  The permits that grant 
agricultural-use rights are not determined by actual use, and they have either 
no expiration dates or expiration dates that are long-term.77  Thus, the policy 
makers have few options to regulate one of the largest categories of water use 
in the state.78  This is particularly problematic in times of drought, during 
which the need to conserve water is the greatest and the relative level of 
agricultural use increases because of greater irrigation requirements.79 
 
 72 See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(a) (2009). 
 73 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(a) (2009). 
 74 The Flint River flows through southwest Georgia.  According to the River Basin Center at the 
University of Georgia, “[t]he Flint River is approximately 350 miles long and drains an area of 8,460 square 
miles.”  Gretchen Loeffler & Judy L. Meyer, River Basin Ctr., Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 
http://www.rivercenter.uga.edu/education/k12resources/basinsofga2.htm. 
 75 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(b)(1) (2009).  The permits may be transferred to 
subsequent owners of the property, subject only to notification of the transfer to the state.  Id.  Changes in the 
use or withdrawal capacity of the water permit must be applied for and approved by the state.  Id. 
 76 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 216 (“[The exemptions] impair the state’s ability to manage its water 
resources effectively.”). 
 77 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(b)(1) (2009). 
 78 See JULIA L. FANNING, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER USE IN GEORGIA, 2000; AND TRENDS, 
1950-2000 (2003), available at http://cms.ce.gatech.edu/gwri/uploads/proceedings/2003/Fanning.pdf (noting 
that irrigation use accounts for almost seventeen percent of water use from all sources, and fifty-one percent of 
groundwater use in Georgia); Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 72 (“Farm uses remain far and 
away the largest use of water in Georgia.”). 
 79 See FANNING, supra note 78 (noting that more irrigation is required during droughts); Hall, Stuntz & 
Abrams, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that demand for irrigation water will increase in areas where drier 
conditions are expected). 
PUCKETT GALLEYSFINAL 6/25/2010  10:33 AM 
1012 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
3. Why Neither Riparianism nor Regulated Riparianism Can Support a 
Tradable Permit Market for Water 
The most significant fundamental requirement for a successful and efficient 
water market is that water-use rights also be secure property rights.80  It is 
unlikely that buyers would be willing to participate in a market for rights if 
those rights are not fully secure from forfeiture or interference by third 
parties.81  Because common law riparian rights and current regulated riparian 
systems have uncertain property rights,82 these systems cannot adequately 
support a market for tradable water permits.83 
Common law riparian rights are not sufficiently clear to support a market 
system that uses tradable permits as its currency.84  Because a riparian’s rights 
are based on the reasonable-use doctrine,85 those rights, in the amount and type 
of use allowed, may change and evolve over time if the needs and uses of other 
riparians change.86  This unstable balance of reasonableness among users 
makes the riparian rights of competing users subject to change based on factors 
that are out of the user’s control.87  This problem would likely be magnified in 
a market system because riparian users would want to sell as many of their 
riparian rights as possible, and it would be unclear how much of the shared 
 
 80 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 230 (“Clearly defined property rights are a prerequisite to any system 
of water rights trading through a market.”); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: 
The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 327 (2000) (“[M]ost 
fundamental to the functioning of markets are the laws that define the property rights that form the ‘objects’ of 
the market’s transactions . . . .”); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1533–34 (1999) (discussing tradable permits in fisheries, stating that “governments must provide 
legal structures to ensure that those with property rights are able to vindicate them”); Huffman, supra note 12, 
at 443 (“One cannot overemphasize the importance of secure, well-defined, and enforceable property rights.  
The rights must be exclusive, universal, and transferable.”). 
 81 Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 230; Tietenberg, supra note 13, at 267 (“Confiscation of rights or simply 
insecure rights could undermine the entire [market trading] process.”). 
 82 See supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.  See also Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 231 (noting the 
lack of clear property rights in water withdrawal permits in Georgia). 
 83 See Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 35 (“[R]ights in water are less certain than in many other 
forms of property, making a true market difficult to achieve.”). 
 84 See Neuman, supra note 15, at 488 (stating riparian rights are “so poorly defined and open-ended as to 
discourage investment”); supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text. 
 85 See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Olivia S. Choe, Note, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era of Scarcity, 
113 YALE L.J. 1909, 1911 (2004) (describing how this inherent uncertainty in riparian rights has prevented 
water markets); Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 35 (stating that litigation over water rights is 
inefficient because court “rulings may soon be mooted by changed conditions”). 
 87 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 16 (“If either of the competing uses changes in 
physical or economic terms, the calculus of reasonableness will change . . . .”). 
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water resource would be allocated to each user.  In addition, disputes over 
common law riparian rights are settled in court based on a number of different 
factors.88  Because different factors may be considered or prioritized 
differently by different courts, riparian rights can be somewhat unpredictable.89 
A second problem that makes common law riparian rights inadequate for a 
tradable permit market is that it is unclear whether common law riparian rights 
are transferable to nonriparian users, and if so, the extent of the rights that can 
be transferred.90  If a water market is to function as efficiently as possible, 
water-use rights must be transferable without regard to where the water will be 
used.91  As Professor Dellapenna has noted, “[t]here is . . . no reason to believe 
that the economically most productive use of water from a particular 
waterbody will always lie on contiguous land.  If riparian rights cannot be 
transferred, then some water must be used at less than its most efficient use.”92 
Regulated riparian systems are also imperfect for the implementation of 
markets for tradable water permits.  The extent of the property right granted 
through a water-withdrawal permit is not always clear.  For example, the 
administering state agency imposes a reasonable-use requirement on the permit 
when there are competing uses.93  It is also unclear in most regulated riparian 
systems whether permits can be transferred.94 
An equally significant problem with regulated riparian systems is certain 
users often are exempt from the permit system.95  As discussed above, the 
exemption of agricultural use from the permit scheme in many states prevents 
 
 88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979) (listing nine factors to be considered to 
determine reasonableness of use). 
 89 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 16 (“Courts, as well as scholars, have considered this 
[instability] a serious impediment to private investment in water development.”). 
 90 See id. at 17–18, 67 (noting the uncertainty as to whose level of reasonable use is acquired by a non-
riparian user); supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Dellapenna, Right to Consume, supra note 34, § 7.04, at 7-108 (noting that the most efficient use 
will not always be on the riparian land). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(e), (g) (2009); see also Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 231 (noting 
that disputes have occurred when permit holders assert private property rights over groundwater); Neuman, 
supra note 15, at 488 (noting that the problems with common law reasonable use are still present in regulated 
riparianism; it is just administrative agencies, rather than courts, making the decision). 
 94 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 38 (“Usually there is no express provision for the 
transfer of water rights or permits between potential users.”); Neuman, supra note 15, at 489.  See supra notes 
55 & 56 and accompanying text. 
 95 See generally Dellapenna, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(3) (discussing statutory preferences for specific uses 
of water in various states); supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
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policy makers from meaningfully regulating agricultural uses in states with 
large farming industries.96  Farm uses that are exempted from the permit 
schemes are still governed by common law riparian rights, which introduces 
the problems associated with that system, as discussed above.97  For these 
reasons, riparianism and regulated riparianism can not adequately support a 
free-market tradable-permit system. 
B. Prior Appropriation Systems 
This section discusses prior appropriation regimes, including the standard 
features of common law prior appropriation systems and how the common law 
has been modified by state legislatures.  It also discusses why prior 
appropriation systems would not adequately support a market for tradable 
water-use permits . 
1. The Prior Appropriation System 
The prior appropriation or appropriative rights system of water rights 
developed in the western states as an alternative to common law riparian 
rights.98  The basic principle of prior appropriation can be summarized as the 
“person who is first in time to appropriate water, is the first in right,” meaning 
the first user to establish a use gains priority to the water source over those 
who come later.99  Under the common law rule, priority is established when a 
user takes a “first step” of appropriating the water by investing time and money 
 
 96 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-105(a) (2009) (exempting farm uses from the 
statutory permit scheme for the withdrawal of surface or ground waters); supra notes 57–66 and accompanying 
text; see also Hall, Stuntz & Abrams, supra note 2, at 33 (“Irrigation accounts for 39 percent of all U.S. water 
withdrawals and 81 percent of consumptive water uses.”). 
 97 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 72–73 (noting this problem specifically in Georgia). 
 98 Owen L. Anderson et al., Introduction and Background, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 
2, § 11.01, at 11-4 [hereinafter Anderson et al., Introduction].  The doctrine discussed in this subsection has 
been referred to as both “prior appropriation,” id., and “appropriative rights.”  E.g., Dellapenna, Water 
Allocation, supra note 1, at 20. 
 99 Owen L. Anderson et al., Elements of Prior Appropriation, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra 
note 2, § 12.01, at 12-3 [hereinafter Anderson et al., Elements].  In Elements of Prior Appropriation, the 
authors note that the doctrine has five basic elements: “(1) person; (2) first in time; (3) to appropriate; (4) 
water; and (5) first in right.”  Id.; see also A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 
76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 881 (2000) (“Prior in time, prior in right is the central dogma of western water law.”).  
For a discussion of how the foundational principles of prior appropriation originated in the early days of the 
American West, see Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
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towards its actual use.100  When there is a shortage, the “oldest” appropriator 
has the highest priority use right and a user with junior priority has no right to 
use any of its allocation until there is enough water to fulfill the allocations of 
all users ahead of it in the priority line.101  Some commentators have noted that 
allocation based on temporal priority, rather than a hierarchy of reasonable or 
necessary use, promotes waste because there is an incentive to withdraw the 
maximum amount of water as soon as possible to gain priority.102  Because 
junior use rights may be forfeited if there is only enough water to meet the 
allocation of more senior users, the system is not conducive to transferable 
rights.103  Unlike common law riparian rights, common law prior appropriation 
does not require that the water be used only on riparian land, which might 
actually facilitate the sale of use rights.104  However, there are usually 
restrictions on where the water can be transported and used,105 which has 
resulted in a lack of water markets in prior appropriation states even if there 
may be the potential for them to exist.106 
Most western states have now codified prior appropriation into the law.107  
Generally, a permit process grants the use rights and establishes priority, with 
 
 100 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(b), at 12-8.  Courts appear often to have decided 
disputes over establishment of priority by looking to custom.  See id. (discussing cases in which first-in-time 
priority is disputed). 
 101 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that this principle may result in complete 
forfeiture of junior rights in times of shortage). 
 102 E.g., id. at 23–24 (“Appropriators thus live in an environment where it is smart to overirrigate.”); 
Tarlock, supra note 99, at 901 (“The strict enforcement of priorities tends to lead to inefficient use practices. 
The cushion of a senior right combined with the ‘use it or lose it’ rules, abandonment and forfeiture, create 
powerful incentives to use the maximum entitlement and to forego investments in water conservation 
infrastructure.”). 
 103 See Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 24–26 (“The recognition and protection of third-
party rights precludes true market transactions.”). 
 104 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(f), at 12-75. 
 105 Id.  Generally, there are four types of restrictions: (1) restrictions that limit transfer from the water’s 
area of origin; (2) restrictions on moving water out-of-state; (3) treatment of irrigation rights as running with 
the land; and (4) restrictions on a junior appropriator’s ability to change the place of use when the change 
improves the standing of the junior user.  Id. 
 106 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 25 (“There never has been a market for appropriative 
rights to any significant extent.”); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private 
Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 577–78 (2007) (“These property rights did not historically lead to 
the creation of active markets, however.  This was primarily because the rules surrounding transfer made 
trading so cumbersome that transfers rarely occurred.”). 
 107 See Anderson et al., Introduction, supra note 98, § 11.01, at 11-4, 11-5 (discussing the historical 
evolution of the prior appropriation doctrine in the western states).  See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 et seq. 
(West 1971). 
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the first appropriator establishing his standing by registering his use first.108  
Most of these statutes require that an appropriator make “beneficial use” of the 
water to retain priority rights; the definition of beneficial use varies from state 
to state.109  For a use to be beneficial “the end use for the water must be a 
generally recognized and socially accepted use (abstract benefit) and the water 
must be put to that use and not ‘let run to waste.’”110  The beneficial use 
requirement is significant because it has been the basis for courts finding that 
an issued permit does not grant a vested property right to the water, but rather a 
right to the water insofar as it is put to a reasonable use.111 
Finally, prior appropriation users are subject to the “no injury” rule, which 
holds that senior priority users cannot change the manner in which they use the 
water if the change will injure junior users.112  For example, if a junior user 
depends on the senior user returning water to the source, the junior user would 
be injured if the senior user allows the water to be used at another location that 
would not return it to the source.113  Thus, the no-injury rule would restrict the 
senior user’s ability to sell the rights to water that had previously been returned 
to its source after use, if the sale would result in the water being used in other 
locations that would no longer return it to the original source.114 
2. Why Prior Appropriation Will Not Support a Tradable Permit Market 
for Water 
Common law prior appropriation cannot adequately support a market for 
tradable permits.  First, any user who is not the first appropriator will 
frequently face some risk that his rights will be surpassed by a higher priority 
user, particularly in times of shortage.115  Second, some courts have placed 
 
 108 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(b), at 12-6.  E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1450 (West 
1971) (priority established as of the date of the application for appropriation permit).  For an assertion that 
priorities are not actually enforced in prior appropriation states, see Tarlock, supra note 99. 
 109 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(c)(2) (surveying beneficial-use statutes from various 
western states); Tarlock, supra note 99, at 882. 
 110 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(c)(2), at 12-26. 
 111 See id. § 12.02(e), at 12-66, 12-67 (surveying case law addressing the issue and noting that “the most 
important restriction [on water rights] may be that an appropriator can only acquire the right to water for a 
beneficial/reasonable use”). 
 112 Eric L. Garner & Janice L. Weis, Coping with Shortages: Managing Water in the 1990s and Beyond, 5 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T  26, 29, 62 (1991); see also Owen L. Anderson et al., Reallocation, Transfers and 
Changes, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 14.04(c) [hereinafter Anderson et al., 
Reallocation] (discussing the no-injury rule). 
 113 See Garner & Weis, supra note 112, at 62. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Dellapenna, Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 24. 
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restrictions on where and how water can be used,116 which would lessen the 
efficiency gains of a market system by limiting the number and type of buyers.  
Third, the beneficial-use requirement, which is now codified in most prior 
appropriation states, presents a risk because it may result in the forfeiture of 
the right.117  Finally, prior appropriation users are subject to the “no injury” 
rule, which can limit the types and locations of use from a particular water 
source and therefore can limit the number of potential buyers of that source’s 
water in a market.118 
Therefore, prior appropriation systems in their current forms are not 
adequate to support a market for tradable water-use permits because the rights 
they grant to users, and the transferability of those rights, are uncertain.  As 
discussed above, riparianism and regulated riparianism are also inadequate 
water-rights systems to support a tradable-permit market.119  A system that 
more clearly defines property rights, allows for full alienability of water 
permits, and brings all water users within the permit system would be more 
suitable for a tradable water-permit market that more fully meets the goals of 
conservation and efficient allocation. 
II. MARKETS FOR TRADABLE WATER PERMITS 
This Part will discuss how tradable-permit systems are structured.  
Specifically, it will discuss the various characteristics and design features of a 
tradable-permit system, and how the goals of the systems determine which 
features are chosen for implementation.  It also will address some common 
criticisms of a free market, tradable-permit system for water. 
A. Tradable Permits 
This section discusses tradable permit systems.  Subsection 1 discusses the 
typical objectives of a tradable permit system and how the structure of such a 
system works to achieve those objectives.  Subsection 2 discusses the 
 
 116 Anderson et al., Elements, supra note 99, § 12.02(f), at 12-75.  See supra note 105 for specific 
examples of the types of restrictions that courts have imposed. 
 117 See id. § 12.02(e), at 12-66 (noting that the extent of property rights in the water is uncertain because 
of the beneficial-userule); supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing the beneficial-use 
requirement). 
 118 See Garner & Weis, supra note 112, at 62 (“The no-injury rule thus may prevent water transfers in 
some instances . . . .”); supra notes 112–14 (discussing the no injury rule). 
 119 See supra Part I.A.3. 
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considerations that policy makers should take into account in designing an 
optimal system. 
1. Goals and Structure of Tradable Permit Programs 
Tradable permits can be used to allocate the amount of a given activity that 
each participant in that activity may undertake.120  They are often used either to 
limit the amount of a common resource that each participant can use or to limit 
the amount of pollutants that each polluter can emit.121  Tradable permits have 
also been used to sustain fisheries122 and regulate land use.123  The 
Environmental Protection Agency has regulated pollution by allowing tradable 
permits for fuel efficiency standards in vehicles and air pollution emissions, 
among other things.124 
Tradable permit schemes have typically been implemented as either a 
credit-trading or a cap-and-trade system.125  In a credit-trading program, each 
participant is allowed to engage in a standardized level of the activity, and if 
the participant uses or pollutes less than its allowed amount, it gains credit for 
that amount, which can then be traded with or transferred to a user who needs 
the surplus to exceed the allowable limit.126  For example, in a program to 
reduce environmentally harmful emissions, a polluter who emits less than the 
limit gains an emission credit that can then be sold to a buyer who can then 
emit more than the limit.127 
A cap-and-trade system sets an overall level of use for a society and allows 
participants to trade use rights.  Its implementation involves three steps: (1) 
determining the total level of acceptable activity; (2) allocating rights among 
participants to engage in the activity; and (3) permitting and facilitating trading 
 
 120 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and 
the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 483–84 (2000) (describing how governments 
can use tradable permits to achieve “the socially optimal level of pollution”); Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 251 
(describing tradable permits as a way to ration “access to the commons”). 
 121 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 616–17 (describing trading programs that manage pollution); 
Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 251 (describing tradable permits as a method of allocating common resources). 
 122 Esty, supra note 80, at 1533–34 (describing tradable permit systems to regulate fisheries). 
 123 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 616. 
 124 Id. at 616 n.14.  The legislation authorizing the trading of fuel-efficiency standards was later repealed.  
Id. 
 125 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 265. 
 126 See id. at 265–66 (noting that activity below the limit “can be certified as surplus”).  Tietenberg notes 
that regulators sometimes have difficulty setting the base level of activity at an appropriate level to avoid 
“unjustified credits.”  Id. at 266. 
 127 See id. at 265 (citing emission-trading programs as an example of credit trading). 
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of use permits.128  The primary goals of a cap-and-trade system are 
sustainability and achieving the most efficient allocation of the right to engage 
in the regulated activity.129  For example, in a cap-and-trade system to regulate 
pollution, the government would determine the acceptable level of total 
pollution for the society, and would then allocate the right to pollute among the 
participants in the polluting activity, with the aggregate of all the participants’ 
pollution rights being equal to the total level of acceptable pollution.130  A 
participant in the activity is then given the choice to use its allotted amount, 
reduce use and sell its unused right, or buy additional rights to increase use.131 
A primary distinction between the two systems is that one is able to limit 
total activity, while the other is not.132  Credit trading does not limit the 
aggregate amount of the activity because new participants can enter the process 
and increase the overall level of activity.133  In a pollution-regulation system, 
for example, new users can gain tradable credits simply by emitting less of the 
pollutant than the allowable limit; these new participants and the new credits 
that they generate would increase the aggregate level of activity.134  
Conversely, in a cap-and-trade program the aggregate level of the activity is 
defined without regard to the number of participants.135  New participants must 
purchase permits from existing users to have the right to engage in the activity, 
so the overall societal activity level or consumption does not change.136 
 
 128 Nash, supra note 120, at 483–85 (identifying and explaining the three steps in implementing a tradable 
permit system for pollution control). 
 129 B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445, 445, 
447 (2007). 
 130 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 617 (using the regulation of pollutants as an example of a cap-and-
trade program with tradable permits). 
 131 Sinden, supra note 106, at 568 (describing the options of polluters in a cap-and-trade pollution control 
system). 
 132 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See id. (noting that this assumes no additional regulatory action is taken to counteract the additional 
activity). 
 135 Id.  As the author notes, this difference between the two systems has social implications because in a 
cap-and-trade system every gain of a right by a participant means that another participant must lose that right.  
Id.  As discussed below, this element of the cap-and-trade system has led some critics to argue that poorer and 
more rural water users would be harmed in a water market because they will be economically outmatched by 
wealthier users.  See supra Part II.B. 
 136 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447. (explaining that new users in a cap-and-trade system cause “some 
or all users [to get] a smaller slice of the resource pie”). 
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Through the market process, cap-and-trade programs using tradable permits 
as currency aim to allocate resources to their best use.137  Indeed, in addition to 
allowing control over the level of an activity for purposes of conservation or 
environmental protection, tradable permit systems tend to increase economic 
efficiency.138  Cap-and-trade systems and credit trading both provide an 
incentive for participants in the regulated activity to increase their efficiency 
because doing so will allow them to sell their rights to use or emit for a 
profit.139  Those efficiency gains may come from advances in technology and 
processes that decrease use or allow for more production without increasing 
resource use.140  Tradable permit systems should also tend to increase the 
economic value of the right to engage in the activity.141 
However, the influence of stakeholders in the system’s structure and 
implementation has the potential to create inefficiencies that negate the 
benefits of a market system.142  One commentator cites inefficient alterations 
to market transfer rules that are implemented to assuage concerns with the 
initial allocation as an example of such influence.143  Another commentator 
 
 137 See id. at 445–48 (“In their ideal conception, cap and trade policies combine the policy goals of 
sustainability and economic efficiency and offer the potential to achieve both simultaneously.”); Jonathan 
Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12–
13 (2007) (describing the two most significant benefits of tradable permit programs as (1) economically viable 
promotion of environmental sustainability and (2) highest economic allocation of scarce resources). 
 138 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447 (noting that in a cap-and-trade system, the “cap” achieves 
conservation, while the “trade” promotes economic efficiency); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 620 (“If the 
cap is set appropriately, marketable permits achieve the same level of protection as command-and-control 
alternatives at a lower cost.”). 
 139 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 620 (using the air pollution permit system as an example of 
encouraging efficiency because more efficient users profit from being able to sell their excess use rights); 
Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 256 (“One of the most desirable aspects of tradable permits for resource users is 
the ability to raise income levels for participants.”). 
 140 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The Bush Administration and 
Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 340 (2005) (“[P]ermit programs may encourage the 
development of new environmental technology and processes that can achieve better results at lower cost. 
Because individuals or companies can trade any reductions that they make in their regulated activities, the 
regulated community has an incentive to develop less expensive, more effective means of making those 
reductions.”).  One example of how economic incentives can encourage users to be more efficient is the EPA’s 
acid rain reduction program, which has resulted in an overall level of actual sulfur dioxide emissions that is 
less than the total allowable amount.  Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 621 (noting that actual emissions in 
1995 were forty percent less than the allowed amount).  Salzman and Ruhl also note that the costs of the 
reductions in the program were estimated to be forty percent lower than they would have been in a command-
and-control system.  Id. 
 141 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 260 (noting that tradable permit systems tend to increase the value of the 
traded resource or lower the cost of pollution control, as the case may be). 
 142 Id. at 272–73. 
 143 Id. 
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argues that politics influences the design, implementation, and ultimately the 
success of tradable permit programs.144  Influential groups with valuable 
interests at stake may be able to use the public’s lack of understanding of the 
issues to influence the policy decisions related to a water market system.145  
Stakeholders whose interests are not aligned with a water market may also try 
to prevent such a system from being implemented at all.146 
2. Considerations in the Design of Tradable Permit Programs 
Policy makers considering a tradable permit system must carefully consider 
how the system will be designed.  Each aspect of the program can be tailored 
to accomplish specific goals.147  The design choices, discussed in detail below, 
include (1) how the permits will be initially allocated among users, (2) whether 
the initial users will be given the permits for free, (3) how trading can be 
structured to encourage participation by all users, and (4) how to remedy 
problems arising from permits being used in circumstances different from 
those for which they were allocated. 
First, when implementing a tradable permit system, policy makers must 
determine how the use permits initially will be allocated; this is one of the 
most difficult issues that must be resolved at the outset of a tradable permits 
system because of the established interests of existing participants.148  
Common initial allocation schemes include those based on the use of each user 
when the system is implemented, auctions,149 a lottery, and a first-come-first-
serve program.150 
 
 144 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 445–46 (noting that because of political influence many cap-and-
trade programs are not as economically beneficial as they might be).  For example, Heinmiller notes that the 
1997 emissions caps in the Kyoto Protocol are the result of a negotiated middle point between the interests of 
environmental and emitters and do not represent a scientifically optimal level.  Id. at 455. 
 145 Esty, supra note 80, at 1548–49 (“[T]he complexity and opacity of many environmental issues and the 
public’s difficulty in perceiving its own interest make the risk of special interest manipulation much more 
severe in the environmental realm than in other fields of regulation or government activity.”). 
 146 See Huffman, supra note 12, at 436 (“Any interest believing that it can serve its interest through the 
political process is likely to oppose markets since the state will provide the resource to them for free.”). 
 147 See Nash, supra note 120, at 483–85 (describing in the context of pollution-control systems, the 
decisions policy makers must make, including the geographic area of coverage, the nature and scope of the 
permit rights, and the method of initial allocation). 
 148 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 269; See also Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 449 (“[C]ap and trade 
policies are most needed and most likely to be introduced in situations of resource scarcity and 
overexploitation where vested interests are already well established and cannot be ignored.”). 
 149 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 575–76 (describing allocation systems for tradable emissions 
permit regimes, including an auction system and “grandfathering” in existing users). 
 150 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 269–70. 
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Some commentators have noted that the initial allocation scheme is 
sometimes dictated by politics rather than considerations of public good, and 
one has stated that a free initial allocation based on existing use is “a necessary 
ingredient” to implementing a tradable permit system.151  The initial allocation 
is extremely important to the stakeholders because it provides access to an 
economically valuable resource at potentially no cost, which could lead to a 
“windfall” for the recipients of initial permits.152  For environmentalists or 
conservationists wishing to hold emission or consumption permits, the initial 
allocation may provide the most economically feasible way to do so; if the 
initial allocation in a water market were free, environmental groups could 
“retire” the permits without having to pay for them, assuming they were 
allowed to take part in the initial allocation.153  Environmentalists in western 
states have already used this method of preservation by purchasing water rights 
and “retiring” them to protect downstream flow.154  In a cap-and-trade system, 
the fact that the permit allocation is a “zero-sum” game—i.e., a system in 
which every permit obtained by a given party is one less permit available for 
all other parties—makes the initial allocation even more important.155 
Likely because of the political influence of the existing users, most tradable 
permit programs use initial allocations that favor existing users.156  One 
drawback of giving free permits to existing users in the initial allocation is that 
it will be more expensive for new users to access the system.157  Another is that 
if users know the initial allocation is based on existing use, they may 
inefficiently increase their use to increase their initial permit allocation.158  The 
inefficient depletion problem could be mitigated by using historical data going 
 
 151 Id. at 254. 
 152 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 450.  The potential for a windfall has been cited as one reason water-
market systems should not be implemented.  See, e.g., John L. Fortuna, Note, Water Rights, Public Resources, 
and Private Commodities: Examining the Current and Future Law Governing the Allocation of Georgia 
Water, 38 GA. L. REV. 1009, 1060 (2004). 
 153 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 450, 461.  Environmentalists could hold the permit, thereby actively 
conserving the resource by leaving fewer water-use rights available for consumption.  Id. at 461. 
 154 Thompson, supra note 140, at 340–41 (describing the increasing activity of “water trusts” in 
purchasing and “retiring” water rights).  It should be noted that environmental groups that engage in “retiring” 
water-use rights in western prior appropriation regimes might face opposition because change-of-use rules are 
applied more rigorously to them than traditional users.  Tarlock, supra note 99, at 902 (noting that this has 
been the case in Oregon as applied to the Oregon Water Trust). 
 155 Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 450 (noting that because of the nature of the process and the economic 
value at stake, “this process is quite clearly political”). 
 156 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 270 (stating that in “virtually all implemented tradable permit programs 
discussed in this article” existing users get free permits). 
 157 See id. at 271 (arguing that free initial allocations disadvantage new users). 
 158 Id. 
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back beyond the time that users knew their level of use would determine their 
initial permit allocation.159 
Some commentators suggest that political and social influence in the 
trading of permits is a significant reason that tradable permit programs are not 
as successful in practice as they are in theory.160  For example, in a tradable 
water permit system, agricultural water users in smaller communities may 
resist selling their water withdrawal rights because of sentimental feelings 
about the significance of the resource to their communities and families, even 
when those users could expect to receive an economic benefit from selling 
their withdrawal rights.161  Because agricultural use is often such a large potion 
of water consumption,162 policy makers must consider ways to encourage 
agricultural and other low-value users to participate in the market when it is 
economically beneficial for them to do so.163 
On the other hand, some reluctance to trade by smaller users may be useful 
to the system by preventing a concentration of rights in too few users, which 
may create too much market power for the concentrated holder and reduce the 
efficiency of the market.164  More proactive methods of dealing with the 
concentration problem have also been used, including placing limits on the 
percentage of rights any one user may hold, government restriction of trades 
that violate public policy, retaining a reserve to dilute the market if needed, and 
requiring an annual auction in which each user must put up a percentage of 
their rights for the auction.165 
Finally, some commentators suggest that a tradable permit system must be 
designed to address issues arising when a permit is used in circumstances other 
 
 159 Cf. id. (noting the problem exists when users know their allocation will be based on historical use). 
 160 See, e.g., Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 461 (describing how political and social pressure may prevent 
lower value water users from participating in the market). 
 161 See id. (noting that these are typically low value users who could expect a financial gain from selling 
their rights).  Heinmiller discusses water trading in Australia and explains that tensions that have developed 
between “buyers,” states with low-value irrigators, and “sellers,” states with higher value users.  Id. at 463.  
But see Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061 (noting the possibility of the opposite problem occurring—that a 
water market could entice farmers in smaller communities to sell their use rights because the rights will be 
more valuable to heavily populated areas). 
 162 Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838. 
 163 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 461–64 (noting the economic benefits of an open market, but 
observing that some users’ reluctance to participate for social or political reasons can negate those benefits). 
 164 See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 273 (describing how concentration in fishery permits has resulted in 
the decline of smaller fishing operations because they are being bought out by larger operations). 
 165 Id. at 273–74. The first two methods have been used in tradable permit markets for fisheries; the latter 
two methods have been used in the United States’ sulfur pollution allowance program.  Id. 
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than those under which it was initially allocated.166  These issues are often 
referred to as “nonfungibilities,”167 and they arise in “environmental trading 
markets” in three different ways: space, type, and time.168  The most prevalent 
of the three is nonfungibility of space.169  Nonfungibility of space can occur 
when, as a result of the trade, the right to use or emit is exercised in a different 
location than it would have been if it had not been traded, so the external effect 
of exercising the right on the environment and third parties changes.170  
Nonfungibility of space can result in “hot spots,” which can occur when there 
is a concentration of an activity in one place.171  When this happens, the same 
level of activity may have a greater marginal impact within the hot spot than it 
would outside of it because there are fewer units of space to absorb the 
activity.172  Commentators have noted that nonfungibility of space can disrupt 
the economic efficiency of the market by introducing externalities and have 
suggested that one way to address this problem is to restrict the geographic 
area of trading.173  Another, less restrictive, potential remedy is to require 
regulatory approval of trades to allow for assessment of nonfungibility.174  
However, both of these methods would likely decrease the economic efficiency 
 
 166 See, e.g., Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 625 (noting that the currency of a tradable permit market 
needs to be designed to address this issue). 
 167 Fungible is defined as “being of such a nature that one part or quantity may be replaced by another 
equal part or quantity in the satisfaction of an obligation.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
507 (11th ed. 2004).  Further, “oil, wheat, and lumber are fungible commodities.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 168 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 611, 625 (explaining fungibility as when “the things exchanged are 
sufficiently similar in ways important to the goals of environmental protection”); see also Tietenberg, supra 
note 12, at 280 (discussing breakdowns in theory when systems are implemented and noting as an example that 
tradable permits are not always homogenous because time and place of use matters). 
 169 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 628. 
 170 See Nash, supra note 137, at 14 (describing “spatial differentiation” in the context of pollution control 
programs and habitat trading programs). 
 171 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 627–28.  The authors cite as an example a hot spot resulting 
from a Los Angeles program that allowed industrial polluters to gain pollution credits by destroying older, 
heavily polluting cars.  Id. at 628.  But critics pointed out that the refineries were closely concentrated; thus, 
after the trades, the reduced emissions from the cars affected a 12,000-square-mile area, while the increased 
emissions from the industrial polluters were now concentrated in a twenty-square-mile area.  Id.; see also Nash 
& Revesz, supra note 15, at 580–81 (discussing hot spots). 
 172 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 628 n.42 (“‘[I]t is immediately pointed out that a ton of any 
particular kind of waste will do much more damage in some places than in others . . . .’” (quoting J.H. DALES, 
POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 79 (1968) (alteration in original))). 
 173 E.g., Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 275 (discussing lack of homogeneity in transfers and geographic 
restrictions on trades). 
 174 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 573 (proposing a system that requires regulatory pre-approval to 
address nonfungibility in emission trading programs); see also Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 275 (noting that 
the U.S. Wetlands program deals with “harmful spatial aspects” by requiring regulatory approval of trades). 
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benefits of the market by disallowing some trades.175  Requiring regulatory 
approval in a water market may also implicitly discourage trading because of 
increased bureaucracy, particularly for smaller users. 
One commentator has explained fungibility of type as simply “[a]pples are 
traded for apples, not oranges.”176  Fungibility of type is most difficult to 
assess when the object of the tradable permit, such as a parcel of land in habitat 
trading, is not homogenous—i.e., no two parcels of land are exactly the 
same.177  Finally, nonfungibility of time arises when a trade results in the 
activity occurring at a different time than that contemplated by the permit, 
causing the marginal effect to be different than the effect intended by the 
permit.178 
Of the three nonfungibilities, nonfungibility of space is likely to pose the 
biggest problem in a tradable permit water market.  Within the context of 
tradable emission permits, water use may be analogous to what have been 
termed “regional” pollutants—those that may travel many miles—”but the 
affected region is defined by reference to where the emissions come from.”179  
Perhaps analogously, water can travel over a broad area, but water shortages 
experienced by downstream users may be related to upstream users’ 
consumption, potentially depriving downstream users of adequate resources to 
fulfill their water-use rights.180 
In addition, environmentalists believe that tradable permits increase the 
potential for hot spots181 because existing users tend to be concentrated, which 
will likely result in the initial allocation of permits being concentrated.182  This 
phenomenon may also occur in a tradable water permit system if large 
industrial users concentrated in cities purchase withdrawal permits from 
 
 175 Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 275 (discussing geographic restrictions on trades and concluding that 
“[s]patial issues can be dealt with within the tradable permit scheme, but those choices typically make transfers 
more difficult”). 
 176 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 629. 
 177 Id.  The authors also cite emission programs that bundle different types of polluting gases into one 
category as an example of nonfungibility of type.  Id. 
 178 Id. at 630; see also Nash, supra note 137, at 17–19 (discussing “temporal differentiation” in 
environmental programs); Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 276 (discussing the “temporal flexibility”). 
 179 Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 576. 
 180 See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 277 (discussing issues that can affect the success of tradable permit 
programs and noting that water regulators “must cope with the consequences of trades on downstream users”). 
 181 For a discussion of hot spots, see supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 182 Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 580–81.  Nash and Revesz note that this problem also may stem 
from older polluters being less likely to convert to better pollution control technologies, forcing them to buy 
additional permits and worsening the hot spot.  Id. 
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agricultural users.  The marginal effect of those withdrawals in areas of 
concentration or water shortage would be greater than the effect of the same 
withdrawal in an area without a concentration or shortage.183 
The easiest way to address spatial fungibility issues is to restrict trading 
within certain geographic zones.184  In a water market system, geographic 
trading restrictions could prevent withdrawal permits that originate in rural 
areas from concentrating in cities, where the resources would be unable to 
fulfill the withdrawals that the permits prescribe.185  However, these types of 
trading restrictions can undercut the economic efficiency gains of a market 
system.186 
Nonfungibility of time may occur in a tradable permit system for water if, 
for example, many users purchased withdrawal permits when there was no 
shortage but did not use them until a shortage occurred, causing a greater 
impact at the time of use than would have occurred at the time of issuance.187  
Restrictions that tie the time of the withdrawal to the time of the sale would be 
one way to address nonfungibility-of -time issues in a water market.188 
Of the three nonfungibilites, type is of the least concern in a water market.  
Nonfungibility of type could conceivably occur because of hydrological 
differences between groundwater and surface water; however, it is unclear 
whether this distinction would have real implications for a water market 
because there seems to be little practical difference between the two.189  Thus, 
nonfungibility of type is of less concern than nonfungibility of space or time in 
water permit trading, but if it were determined to be a legitimate concern, it 
could be addressed by having a permit specific to each source.190 
 
 183 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 237 (discussing interbasin transfers and their potential negative impact 
on “hydrologic capacity” in areas of shortage). 
 184 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 638. 
 185 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 573 (proposing a system that requires regulatory pre-approval to 
address nonfungibility in emission trading programs); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 638–39 (discussing 
geographic trading restrictions). 
 186 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 636 (discussing transaction costs and their negative effect on 
economic efficiency); see also supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 187 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 188 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 642 (“Temporal nonfungibilities may be neutralized by 
restricting trades to narrow time periods.”). 
 189 See Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
91, 99 (2008) (“It has long been known that groundwater and surface water are hydrologically related, and 
there have long been calls to link their legal treatment.”). 
 190 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 640 (noting that in emissions-trading schemes, trades are 
restricted to the same pollutant and mixing of pollutants does not occur). 
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B. Criticisms of Water Market Proposals 
Commentators have noted more potential negative consequences of water 
markets than this Comment is able to address.  However, it will discuss how a 
tradable permit system might be structured to address the following concerns: 
that (1) the states will be unable to control the sale of water resources to out-of-
state buyers because of the dormant Commerce Clause;191 (2) the agricultural 
industry may be damaged because it will become more lucrative to sell water 
rights than to use them for irrigation to harvest crops;192 (3) the permits would 
increase water use as current users sell their excess rights;193 and (4) 
transaction costs will negate economic gains from the system.194  This section 
will discuss some ways a tradable permit system might be designed to address 
these concerns. 
Commentators have noted that the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
could prevent states that adopt a free market for water rights from transferring 
their water rights to out-of-state users.195  The Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine holds that states may not enact policies that are economically 
protectionist or that discriminate against interstate trade in favor of intrastate 
trade.196  The critics of the water market describe a scenario in which a private 
holder of a large water use permit sells its rights to use water within the state to 
the highest bidder, who happens to be out of state and plans to transfer the 
water out of state; they contend that the state would be powerless, with narrow 
exceptions, to stop such an interstate transfer.197  The seminal case on the 
application of the Commerce Clause to water resources is Sporhase v. 
Nebraska.198  In Sporhase, the Court held that groundwater is an article of 
commerce subject to Dormant Commerce Clause analysis199 and struck down a 
 
 191 See Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 234 (“[T]he dormant commerce clause . . . could limit the power of 
the state to prevent the export of its water resources to other states or countries . . . .”); Draper, supra note 10, 
at 53 (discussing the Commerce Clause’s effect on tradable property rights for water); Fortuna, supra note 152, 
at 1051 (describing the “substantial constitutional implications” that a market for water-withdrawal permits 
would create). 
 192 E.g., Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061. 
 193 E.g., id. 
 194 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 51–52 (discussing transaction costs and “externalities”). 
 195 See supra note 191. 
 196 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (“The crucial inquiry, therefore, 
must be directed to determining whether [the statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can 
fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are 
only incidental.”). 
 197 Draper, supra note 10, at 53. 
 198 458 U.S. 941 (1982), see also Draper, supra note 10, at 53. 
 199 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953–54. 
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Nebraska law restricting interstate transfers of Nebraska groundwater as 
unconstitutional.200 
The Sporhase holding has several potential loopholes that might be used by 
states to restrict out-of-state transfers.  The Court acknowledges that a state has 
a legitimate interest in conservation and preservation of its water resources “in 
times of severe shortage”: A “State’s power to regulate the use of water in 
times and places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its 
citizens—and not simply the health of its economy—is at the core of its police 
power.”201  The law in Sporhase was constitutionally flawed because its 
reciprocity requirement did not further a legitimate interest—it would restrict 
the transfer of water to its most beneficial use if that use was out of state and 
would do so even when water was abundant at the point of withdrawal.202  
Thus, the Court noted that a “demonstrably arid State conceivably might be 
able to marshal evidence to establish a close means–end relationship between 
even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and 
preserve water.”203  This statement from the Court seems to indicate that a state 
facing a severe shortage that threatens the health of its citizens could make a 
compelling case to strictly protect its resources from out-of-state transfers. 
Some commentators have noted states might also restrict out-of-state 
transfers without running afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis by 
using a “basis of origin” rule,204 which would restrict transfers out of the 
water’s geological base or “watershed.”205  Such a rule would seem to apply 
equally to anyone out of the basis, whether they were in or out of state.206  
Analysis of the constitutionality of such a rule is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, but commentators have noted that it is unlikely that the rule would 
be upheld under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis because protectionist 
policies within subdivisions in a state are no more constitutional than if they 
 
 200 Id. at 960.  The Nebraska law required any person or entity that wanting to transport water from 
Nebraska for use in another state to apply for a permit, which would only be granted if the state to which the 
water was being transported granted reciprocal rights to transfer water to Nebraska.  Id. at 944. 
 201 Id. at 956. 
 202 Id. at 958. 
 203 Id. 
 204 E.g., Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 619. 
 205 Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 235–36 (proposing that Georgia could impose transfer restrictions based 
on watersheds for the purpose of protecting “hydrologic integrity”). 
 206 See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 619 (“Proponents argue that there is no discrimination because 
all potential users outside the boundaries of the watershed are treated alike . . . .”). 
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were implemented by the state.207  And a basis-of-origin restriction may also 
lessen the viability of a water market if transfers could not be made from areas 
with excess water resources to areas with shortages.208 
Even if Sporhase leaves states completely unable to prevent out-of-state 
transfers of their water resources, interstate transfers would help promote the 
highest economic use of water resources by expanding the potential market and 
providing an economic benefit to the selling permit holder.209  If each state 
participating in the market were to allow tradable permits for water use, each 
would stand to benefit from the economic efficiency promoted by a free-
market system, even if those tradable permits flow across state lines.210  The 
economic efficiency that is realized by free trade across state borders is the 
basis underlying the Commerce Clause’s invalidation of protectionist state 
policies.211  Under the proposed system, a state would at the very least be able 
to regulate the total depletion of its resources through management of the 
allowable withdrawal attached to each permit, while still gaining the economic 
benefit from maximizing the efficient use of its resources.212 
Next, some commentators argue that the force of supply and demand, 
which could drive prices for water in the market higher, would harm the ability 
of individual households and agricultural users to obtain, or retain, water-use 
rights, and further, that, aside from the basic human need for water, this could 
lead to destruction of smaller communities that rely on small agricultural 
operations.213  However, each municipality would receive an initial allocation 
 
 207 Id. at 619–20 (discussing Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992), which invalidated a state law that isolated its counties from solid waste 
produced outside of the county). 
 208 Cf. Barmeyer, supra note 17, at 236 (noting that in Georgia permit transfers from agricultural areas to 
Atlanta could violate a prohibition against interbasin transfers). 
 209 See Nash, supra note 120, at 484–85 (noting that geographic restrictions reduce the potential number 
of participants, thus increasing the cost of finding trading partners).  For a discussion of the economic benefits 
of a market system, see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 210 See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 607 (“Reducing the size of a market area by limiting water 
exports constrains the ability to move water from inefficient uses to more efficient ones.”). 
 211 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (“‘This principle that our economic unit is 
the Nation . . . has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units. . . . [W]hat is ultimate is the 
principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.’” 
(quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949)). 
 212 See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 604 (arguing that limiting a market geographically sacrifices 
possible gains from efficient allocation). 
 213 E.g., Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1058, 1061; Neuman, supra note 15, at 463 (noting that water markets 
can lead to a concentration of rights in the wealthy).  But see Huffman, supra note 12, at 435–36 (noting this 
argument from critics, but dismissing it as an “[un]persuasive reason to oppose the creation of water 
markets”).  For a discussion of how this issue has been addressed in tradable permits for fisheries, see 
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of withdrawal permits sufficient to supply its citizens with water for domestic 
use under the proposed system.  In times of severe shortage, sufficient water to 
meet basic human needs would take precedent.  In Sporhase, the Court 
indicates that state governments have wide latitude to ensure the availability of 
water for its citizens.214  If a water provider were forced to pay high prices to 
increase its supply and were forced to pass those increases to domestic 
consumers, water subsidies could be implemented to ensure that those who 
may not be able to afford higher prices have access to water.215  Such policies 
recognize the conflict between ultimate economic efficiency and the desire for 
all users to have an equal ability to utilize the market for their benefit.  Policy 
makers are allowed to make judgments that strike the appropriate balance 
between those goals.216 
A related argument against tradable permits is that because agricultural 
users typically do not use their full allocation of water rights under current 
laws, overall use would increase if they were allowed to sell excess use rights 
on an open market and the shortage problems would be exacerbated.217  
However, in a system where the initial allocation is not based on the current 
withdrawal rights, but rather on a reasonable amount actually needed to sustain 
current operations, the overall withdrawal amount would not increase by a 
large margin.218  Agricultural users would then be encouraged to increase the 
efficiency of their water use219 so that they could sell the remaining withdrawal 
 
Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 274.  For a discussion and examples of how a price or value can be determined 
for water in a market, see Willey & Graf, supra note 65, at 331–34. 
 214 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (“[A] State’s power to regulate the use of water in 
times and places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens . . . is at the core of its 
police power.”). 
 215 See Huffman, supra note 12, at 436 (“If society cares about fairness, it is possible to create needs-
tested subsidy programs to assure that the poor get the water they need for basic human survival.”). 
 216 See Esty, supra note 80, at 1572 (“[E]ffective environmental procedures may not take full cognizance 
of other social values such as justice or equity.  If all the [resources] are owned by the rich, a property rights-
based allocation system may be efficient, but it will not be just.  Optimal environmental governance must 
therefore be understood to be both relative and contextual.  A theory of optimal governance defines a 
theoretical goal and a process, but does not offer a definitive answer to every policy question.”). 
 217 Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061. 
 218 The initial allocation cap based on current use would also alleviate concerns that tradable permits 
based on current rights, which often allow withdrawal amounts much greater than those actually used, would 
provide a “windfall” to current users.  See id. at 1060 (arguing that a windfall would result for current permit 
holders).  Profit for permit holders would come from efficiency gains in their operations or reduced use—not 
from selling excess use initially allocated to them.  For additional discussion of why the “windfall” criticism of 
water markets is unfounded, see Huffman, supra note 12, at 435. 
 219 Inefficient agricultural uses may include irrigation that produces relatively low-value crops, unlined 
ditches used for water diversion and low-technology flood irrigation.  See Matthews & Pease, supra note 9, at 
603 n.5. 
PUCKETT GALLEYSFINAL 6/25/2010  10:33 AM 
2010] TRADING WATER 1031 
rights for a profit to users with increasing demand, such as growing population 
centers.220  Because agriculture is such a large portion of consumptive uses of 
water,221 the improvements in efficiency that would be promoted by a cap on 
withdrawal would free up water for other uses.222  One commentator argues 
that this excess water would allow agricultural businesses at once to continue 
their operations and sell remaining water rights.223  Further, these gains in 
conservation through more efficient use may outweigh the potential threat to 
the agricultural industry.224 
As with any market system, there is a risk that transaction costs may erode 
any economic gains.225  Generally, transaction costs include not only the 
transacting parties’ costs, but also costs to third parties that are not reflected in 
the price of the transaction.226  The more that the system and permits are 
tailored to address nonfungibilities,227 are restricted by geographic area,228 or 
are regulated to protect certain users,229 the more economic efficiency is lost to 
transaction costs because increased regulation increases the costs of the 
 
 220 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 263–64 
(2000) (“The government can allocate reductions based on historical use or seniority and rely on the market for 
meeting economic needs and changing demands.”).  Professor Thompson notes that in western states, “the 
transfer of merely a tenth of current agricultural water can more than double the water available for growing 
metropolitan areas.”  Id. at 264; see also Thompson, Jr., supra note 15, at 195 (“Tradable  
permits . . . encourage entities to find ways of further improving their performance since the entities can then 
sell their unneeded permits . . . .”); supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 221 Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838 (stating that irrigation is “generally the most 
heavily consumptive use of water”); Thompson, Jr., supra note 220, at 264 (stating that agricultural use 
composes eighty percent of water use in the western part of country). 
 222 See Neuman, supra note 15, at 468 (stating that smaller agricultural users, who are often the most 
inefficient, currently do not have an economic incentive to improve). 
 223 Id. at 473 (“[I]nsisting that urban or conservation-driven water demands are a threat to the agriculture 
industry’s viability ignores the tremendous potential for conserving water in the agricultural sector.”). 
 224 Id. 
 225 See Draper, supra note 10, at 51–52 (discussing potential transactions costs in a water market and 
stating that “[t]he most serious direct economic consequence of for-profit water trading is the inability of 
bilateral water transactions between sellers and buyers to consider the effects of the transaction on third 
parties”); Nash, supra note 120, at 485 (“[G]overnment must be careful that the transaction costs do not 
become so high that they preclude the establishment and maintenance of a viable market.”). 
 226 Draper, supra note 10, at 51; Willey & Graff, supra note 21, at 335. 
 227 See Part II.A.2 for a discussion of nonfungibilities. 
 228 Nash, supra note 120, at 484–85 (noting that geographic restrictions reduce the potential number of 
participants, thus increasing the cost of finding trading partners). 
 229 See supra Part II.A.2.  For example, constructing regulatory barriers to trade that are designed to 
protect agricultural communities from loss of resources. 
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trade.230  Transaction costs occurring outside of the trade noted by 
commentators include depleted resources for downstream users caused by 
upstream use231 and the potential damage to the agricultural industries and the 
small communities they support because those users may find it more 
profitable to sell water rights than to use them for irrigation.232  Because of this 
tradeoff between economic efficiency on the one hand and an optimal system 
design to protect against nonfungibility and harm to third-parties on the other, 
“the policy instrument’s viability rests on a balance.”233  In a tradable permit 
water market, policy makers would have to determine the point at which the 
non-economic and third-party costs of the market are outweighed by the 
benefits of water conservation and efficient allocation, a determination that 
might itself be deemed a transaction cost.234 
III.  WHAT WOULD A MARKET FOR TRADABLE WATER PERMITS LOOK LIKE? 
As described in Part II, tradable permit systems are typically structured in 
one of two forms: credit trading and cap and trade.235  This Comment argues 
that water markets are needed to conserve and efficiently allocate a scarce 
resource through a market system that caps aggregate use and that tradable 
permits should be the currency of such a system because they can be structured 
as secure property rights that are freely tradable.  This system would allow 
policy makers to determine and impose a sustainable level of use and, through 
 
 230 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 636 (explaining that increased cost in design and management of 
the system may lessen participation in trading); Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 273 (“[A]dditional restrictions 
tend to raise transaction costs and to limit the cost-effectiveness of the program.”). 
 231 See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 106, at 579 (“One right holder’s diversion of surface water can have 
important impacts on downstream users.”). 
 232 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 10, at 51; Sinden supra note 106, at 581. 
 233 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 636.  Salzman and Ruhl note that some level of nonfungibility is 
desirable, if not critical, to a functioning market; otherwise there would be no need for the participants to trade.  
Id. at 645.  The more nonfungible the currency (the permit), the more active the market will be.  Id. at 645–46; 
see also Draper, supra note 10, at 51 (“[I]f the rights and costs of third parties are included in the water rights 
transfer, transaction costs rapidly become exorbitant.”). 
 234 See Draper, supra note 10, at 51 (“In any large and complex hydrologic system, the difficulty and 
expense of structuring the necessary third-party transaction costs frustrates the development of markets unless 
the law chooses to disregard the externalities.”); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 637 (noting that 
“aggressive market construction” aimed at reducing external effects is dangerous because it can cause even 
more problematic flaws in the ability of the market to function); Sinden, supra note 106, at 582 (“[W]hen 
ecological and community impacts are added to the mix, the government’s role in approving trades must 
necessarily shift from one of simply facilitating bargaining among affected parties to making substantive 
judgments about the level of impact that is acceptable or desirable.”). 
 235 See supra notes 125–27. 
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the use of the market, would encourage users to consume the resource more 
efficiently.236 
Both cap and trade and credit trading tend to promote economic 
efficiency,237 but credit trading does not cap use.238  In areas with rapidly 
growing populations and industry,239 the inability of regulators to cap the 
aggregate level of consumption would decrease their ability to maintain the 
desired level of conservation as new users are added to the system.240  
Therefore, credit trading is not as effective as a cap-and-trade system for 
maintaining sustainable levels of water use.  Under this proposed system, 
policy makers would determine an annual level of sustainable use and then 
divide the use rights, which would automatically renew each year among the 
users.241 
For a cap-and-trade system to effectively regulate aggregate use, all water 
users must be accounted for within the system.242  Therefore, current permit 
systems under regulated riparian243 and prior appropriation244 systems, which 
exempt some large-scale users from permit requirements, must be expanded 
and modified to eliminate wide-ranging exemptions.  In many states, this 
would require currently exempted users—often agricultural users—to be 
brought into the permit system.245  Continuing to allow a large portion of water 
use to be largely unregulated cripples the ability of the system to conserve 
resources because often the largest categories of use are the ones out of the 
 
 236 See supra notes 15 & 220 and accompanying text. 
 237 Credit trading promotes more efficient use of resources because users can sell credits they have 
accumulated by becoming more efficient.  See Tietenberg, supra note 12, at 265. 
 238 See generally Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 445–48. 
 239 For example, it has been estimated that metro-Atlanta’s population will double over the next twenty-
five years.  Shelton, supra note 9. 
 240 See Heinmiller, supra note 129, at 447 (“[I]f the number of users in a credit program increases, 
aggregate resource use will also increase . . . .”). 
 241 Cf. Nash, supra note 137, at 14 (noting that in pollution programs, the level is usually set on an annual 
basis). 
 242 For a discussion of how exempting certain users from the permit system impairs the ability of the 
system to effectively conserve water, see supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
 243 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 244 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 245 See supra Part I.A.2.  There may be a level of use at which it is no longer productive to regulate the 
consumption by a user.  For example, the cost of regulating a rural household withdrawing water from a 
ground well might be greater than the benefit.  However, this Comment takes the position that such decisions 
should be made on the basis of value added to the goals of the system—not on the basis of political influence.  
See supra notes 142–46. 
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reach of regulators.246  The system proposed by this Comment would bring 
most users247 within the permit system so that all water use would be regulated. 
Water rights that are traded in an active market must be secure property 
rights so that participants can be certain of what rights they are buying and 
selling, and they must be transferable.248  As described in Part I, water rights 
under current laws are often uncertain, as is their transferability.249  Under the 
proposed system, a use permit would specify how much water the owner is 
entitled to withdraw within a given time period, and it would not be subject to 
the rights of any other users or permits.  The permit would automatically renew 
annually.250  Thus, once a permit is obtained, the user would be certain that his 
property right in the permit’s allowable use would remain secure.251 
Under the proposed system, permits initially would be allocated through a 
free distribution to existing users based on existing and historical use.252  As 
noted in Part II.B, one criticism of water markets has been that overall 
consumption would actually increase because users who do not currently use 
all the water to which they have a common law right would sell their excess 
use rights once a market is available to do so.253  However, if the initial 
allocation of use permits were based on existing or historical use, rather than 
on available common law or current permit use rights, overall water 
consumption would not increase.254  Basing allocation on actual use also 
alleviates the problem of giving existing users a windfall because they will not 
have an initial excess of rights available for sale; rather, they will have to 
reduce use or become more efficient in their use to realize profits from selling 
permits.255 
 
 246 See Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles, supra note 1, at 838 (noting that irrigation use is generally one of 
the most consumptive uses). 
 247 See supra note 245. 
 248 See supra notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text. 
 249 See supra Part I.A.3 & Part I.B.2. 
 250 See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 251 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 617 (discussing environmental trading markets and stating that 
the rights attached to the tradable permit compel “the government [to] create[] a new form of property,” which 
can be characterized as the right to engage in a certain activity or use a common resource). 
 252 See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the initial allocation is based 
on historical use. 
 253 Fortuna, supra note 152, at 1061. 
 254 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 255 See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text. 
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A water market should be structured to attempt to alleviate any 
nonfungibilities that exist.  As discussed in Part II.A.2, nonfungibility of space 
is most likely to present a problem in water markets, although nonfungibility of 
time and type may also be issues, but to a lesser extent.256  Nonfungibility of 
space should be prevented to the extent that it creates harmful hot spots that 
occur when permits are concentrated in an area where the marginal effect of 
use in the hot spot is greater than it would be if the use were to occur where the 
permit originated.257 
In the proposed system, nonfungibility-of-space issues could be managed 
by monitoring all trades.258  Geographic zones would be delineated by 
matching levels of use with available resources, and trades would be tracked to 
determine the concentration of permits in each area.  For example, permits 
flowing from rural agricultural areas to cities would be monitored because they 
would be moving to an area of greater consumption.259  Regulators would then 
be able to block trading activity if it appeared that hot spots were going to 
strain the water resources in the concentrated area or if overuse in the 
concentrated area would deprive downstream users of their use rights.260  
However, the level at which trades would be blocked must be carefully 
considered so as not to prevent the market from functioning inefficiently and 
imposing burdensome transactions costs that negate the efficiency gains; this 
calls for a balance that policy makers ultimately will have to determine—a task 
that admittedly is a difficult one.261 
Nonfungibility of time seems to be most troublesome in times of severe 
water shortage.  For example, adequate resources may not be available to 
fulfill a withdrawal permit during a severe water shortage even though there 
may have been adequate resources at the time of the trade.  Nonfungibility of 
time has been addressed in other tradable permit systems by imposing time 
limits on tradable permits.262  However, in the proposed water market, 
 
 256 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 257 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 25, at 628 n.42.  For a discussion of hot spots, see supra notes 171–
72 & 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 258 Cf. Nash & Revesz, supra note 15, at 573 (proposing an emission-trading system that requires pre-
approval of trades based on a model that assesses the marginal effect of the trade). 
 259 For a discussion of the possible effects of transfers from agricultural areas to cities, see Fortuna supra 
note 152, at 1062–63. 
 260 For a discussion of hot spots, see supra notes 171–72 & 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 261 For a discussion of transaction costs, see supra notes 225–34. 
 262 For example, in emissions-trading programs, an emission permit may have a time limit attached within 
which the allowable emission must occur.  See, e.g., Salzman and Ruhl, supra note 25, at 642 (describing 
temporal limits in trading programs). 
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imposing time limits would be impractical because withdrawal rights would be 
measured by the amounts withdrawable within each year, and the right to 
would renew annually.263 
One possible solution would be to review the problem arising from 
nonfungibility of time before each renewal period begins, allowing for an 
adjustment in use amounts if, at that time, resources were inadequate for the 
amount of existing permitted use.  However, as noted above, the tradable 
permit grants a right to water withdrawal that must be secure and certain; it 
must continue to renew at the same amount in each new period.264  Thus, it 
may not be possible to impose time limits on the use of water permits while 
still maintaining their value to market participants.  A perfect solution to this 
difficult issue may not exist; regulators will need to have an accurate forecast 
of resources at the program’s outset to avoid permitting too much use in the 
market during times of shortage.  But the value of having use rights attached to 
the permit that are certain outweigh the risks of nonfungibility of time. 
This proposed system allows regulators and policy makers to achieve a 
sustainable level of overall water use by placing a cap on total use.  It also 
provides incentive for water resources to be used more efficiently because 
users who use less water can benefit economically by selling their unused 
rights.  Rights to use water resources, and the ability to transfer those rights, 
will be secure and free from the vagaries of riparian rights and prior 
appropriation regimes, allowing participants in the market to buy and sell a 
secure asset freely. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that a market system for water-withdrawal 
rights, using tradable permits as its currency, should be implemented by states 
to address water shortages.  A cap-and-trade structure would allow policy 
makers to determine a sustainable level of water use and to impose that 
sustainable limit by requiring all water use to be accounted for within the 
permit system.  Implementing a cap-and-trade permit system would allow 
regulators to set conservation goals and implement long-term strategies rather 
than the short-term measures that traditionally have been used during 
 
 263 See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 264 Supra notes 250 & 251 and accompanying text. 
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shortages.265  This system also would promote efficient allocation of water 
resources through the market structure. 
This Comment has argued that current water-rights regimes do not provide 
adequate property rights or alienability of those rights to support a market for 
tradable water permits.  Therefore, a tradable-permit system for water use 
would have to be implemented within a new water-rights system that would 
ensure secure property rights and full transferability among users.  These 
permits would be issued to current users at no charge and would be based on 
the user’s current and historical use level.  By capping aggregate water use and 
promoting more efficient use of water resources through a market structure, 
water shortages can be addressed with long-term planning and conservation 
through permanent systems, rather than with inadequate short-term measures. 
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